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THE FCC AND MEDIA OWNERSHIP: THE LOSS OF
THE PUBLIC INTEREST STANDARD
BYRON L. DORGAN*
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once wrote:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fight-
ing faiths, they may come to believe even more than they
believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes safely can be carried out.1
While Justice Holmes's jurisprudence has generally been
credited with being critical to First Amendment precedent in our
country,' this quote also serves to illustrate the importance of
media diversity, which is so fundamentally connected to First
Amendment principles. Without diversity in broadcasting, the
whole concept of a marketplace of ideas would be defeated by
the controlling interests of a few.
Because media diversity necessarily first depends on who it is
that controls the airwaves, the government has been placed in
the role of maintaining this diversity. As the allocator of broad-
cast licenses, the government is the gatekeeper of the controlling
interests. Hence, in the interest of preserving the First Amend-
ment goals of diversity of voices and points of view on our
nation's airwaves, the government has historically imposed limits
on local and national media ownership.
I. PUBLIC INTEREST AS THE GUIDING PRINCIPLE
The principal government guidance to license allocation is
contained in the 1934 Communications Act. In that Act, Con-
gress directs the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
* United States Senator, North Dakota. Legislative Counsel Daphna
Peled contributed to the development of this essay.
1. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
2. See, e.g., Jim Mitchell, Justice Holmes and Free Speech in a Time of Terror,
ARiz. DAILY STAR, Sept. 18, 2001, at http://www.u.arizona.edu/ -mitchell/
holmes.html (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public
Policy).
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numerous times to serve the "public interest, convenience, and
necessity" in issuing licenses.' As a result, for decades, the FCC,
and its predecessor agency the Federal Radio Commission, have
required broadcasters to be responsive to local concerns and to
represent a diversity of views and opinions.
Although the FCC has done away with the fairness doctrine,
which required radio and television broadcasters to allow fair
coverage to each side of a public issue, a Supreme Court case on
that doctrine provides a valuable analysis of the historical impor-
tance of the public interest standard in relation to broadcasters.
In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, the Supreme Court rec-
ognized the finite frequencies available to the FCC to allocate to
broadcasters and noted that the government must be allowed to
require a licensee to "conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary
with obligations to present those views and voices which are rep-
resentative of his community and which would otherwise, by
necessity, be barred from the airwaves."4
The Court not only found no conflict between such regula-
tion and the First Amendment; in fact, it noted that "[i] t is the
purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited mar-
ket-place of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather
than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it
be by the Government itself or a private licensee."5
The Court affirmed that government regulation may be nec-
essary in order to ensure that there is a more open discussion of
issues and a more informed public. In fact, the Red Lion Court
noted that "[ilt is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the
right of the broadcasters, which is paramount."6
Because the ultimate goal is to serve the public interest,
broadcasters are merely "public trustees," or as the Supreme
Court referred to them in Red Lion, "fiduciaries." This tenet was
set forth as early as the 1930s by the Federal Radio Commission,
which stated that "the station itself must be operated as if owned
by the public .... It is as if people of a community should own a
station and turn it over to the best man in sight with this injunc-
tion: 'Manage this station in our interest.' "7
3. See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-161 (2000).
4. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969).
5. Id. at 390.
6. Id.
7. ADVISORY COMM. ON PUBLIC INTEREST OBLIGATIONS OF DIGITAL TELEVI-
SION BROADCASTERS, CHARTING THE DIGITAL BROADCASTING FUTURE, FINAL
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMM. ON PUBLIC INTEREST OBLIGATIONS OF DIGITAL
TELEVISION BROADCASTERS 19 (Comm. Print 1998) [hereinafter CHARTING THE
DIGITAL BROADCASTING FUTURE] (quoting In re Schaeffer Radio Co. (FRC 1930),
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For a long time, the FCC recognized the importance of its
public interest obligations in overseeing broadcasters, and its reg-
ulations reflected these goals. The FCC required broadcasters to
take specific steps to demonstrate responsiveness to local con-
cerns and to represent a diversity of views and opinions.' This
was in keeping with the principle that a broadcaster was merely
licensed to use the airwaves, as the airways belong to the public.9
For example, the FCC at one point required license appli-
cants to "show what the applicant has done to ascertain the
problems, needs and interests of the residents of his community
of license and other areas he undertakes to serve ... and what
broadcast matter he proposes to meet those problems, needs and
interests, as evaluated."1" These "ascertainment requirements"
included consulting with leaders of the significant groups in the
community to be served and with members of the general
public. 1
Other rules included requiring broadcasters to maintain
program logs, limit advertising time, and air certain amounts of
public affairs programming.1 2 These obligations required broad-
casters to be in touch with their communities and monitor con-
tent in order to ensure fulfillment of the public interest
standard.
In addition to these rules for acquiring or maintaining a
license, the FCC also enacted limits on ownership by a licensee.
The FCC "has long acted on the theory that diversification of
mass media ownership serves the public interest by promoting
diversity of program and service viewpoints, as well as by prevent-
ing undue concentration of economic power."13 As a result, the
FCC acted to limit a single entity in a community from holding
more than one broadcast license and limited common ownership
both within a broadcast service and between broadcast services. 4
quoted inJohn W. Willis, The Federal Radio Commission and the Public Service Respon-
sibility of Broadcast Licensees, 11 FED. COMM. BJ. 5, 14 (1950)), available athttp://
www.ntia.doc.gov/pubintadvcom/piacreport.pdf (on file with the Notre Dame
Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy); see also Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 380.
8. CHARTING THE DIGITAL BROADCASTING FUTURE, supra note 7, at 33.
9. Id. at 1; see 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1997); see generally FCC v. Sanders Bros.
Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1939).
10. In the Matter of Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by
Broadcast Applicants, Part I, Sections IV-A and IV-B of FCC Forms, 27 F.C.C.2d
650, app. B, question 3 (1971).
11. Id. at question 4.
12. CHARTING THE DIGITAL BROADCASTING FUTURE, supra note 7, at 24.
13. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 383 (3d. Cir. 2004)
(citing FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 780 (1978)).
14. Id.
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II. A SHIFT IN POLICY
Over the years, however, the FCC's vision of the public inter-
est standard shifted away from a regulatory approach to a more
hands-off style relying instead on marketplace competition to
achieve its public interest goals. The FCC eliminated the long-
standing rules that had served localism and diversity, such as the
ascertainment standards and the program log requirements. 5
Instead, broadcasters and the marketplace took on the role of
enforcing the general responsibility to serve the local community
and the public interest.
Coupled with this troubling shift away from a strict enforce-
ment of the FCC's public interest standard, an even more strik-
ing departure in the area of the media concentration rules
occurred, which has done great harm to the preservation of the
public interest standard. Beginning in the 1980s, the FCC began
to significantly relax ownership limits, starting with waivers of
existing limits." For example, in 1984, the FCC revised the
"seven station rule," a television ownership limit that had been in
place for thirty years, raising the permitted common ownership
to twelve television broadcast stations.17
This trend was exacerbated by the 1996 Telecommunica-
tions Act (the 1996 Act), which extended the length of broadcast
licenses from five to eight years, raised the national television
audience reach cap, and eased radio limitations."8 In addition,
Section 202(h) of the 1996 Act ordered the FCC to conduct a
biennial review of its existing broadcast ownership rules and "to
repeal or modify any regulation" determined "to no longer be in
the public interest."' 9
It is important to note that Section 202(h) does not direct
the FCC to relax its ownership rules; however, subsequent events
have shown that the FCC majority interpreted Section 202(h) in
this fashion. °
15. CHARTING THE DIGITAL BROADCASTING FUTuRE, supra note 7, at 24.
16. Id.
17. See Multiple Ownership of AM, FM, TV, and Cable TV Stations, 49
Fed. Reg. 19,482 (May 8, 1984) (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (1984)).
18. CHARTING THE DIGITAL BROADCASTING FuTuRE, supra note 7, at 24.
19. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(h), 110
Stat. 56, 129 (1996) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000)).
20. See Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 394-95 (3d. Cir.
2004).
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III. EXISTING RULES AND MARKETPLACE AT THE TIME OF THE
FCC MEDIA OWNERSHIP RULES REVIEW
As a result of Section 202(h), the FCC began a review of the
media ownership rules that were in place, and after several court
remands of its proposed revisions, began its most recent rules
review in September 2002, resulting in its Report and Order
issued on June 2, 2003 ('June 2nd order").2
In this third review of media ownership rules, there were six
rules under review. These included two national and four local
rules: (1) the national television ownership cap, which was set at
thirty-five percent; (2) the dual television network rule, which
bars a company in a market from owning more than one of the
top four broadcast networks of ABC, CBS, Fox, or NBC; (3) the
newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership rule, which prohibits a
company from owning both a daily newspaper and a local televi-
sion or radio station in the same market; (4) the radio/television
cross-ownership rule, which limits the number of television sta-
tions and radio stations a company can own in a market; (5) the
local television multiple ownership rule (known as the "TV duop-
oly rule"), which limits the number of local television stations a
company can own in a market; and (6) the local radio ownership
rule, limiting the number of radio stations a company can own in
a market.2 2
Section 202(h) instructs the FCC to determine whether, as a
result of competition, the ownership rules should be modified or
repealed. 23 Thus, the state of competition in the marketplace is
a key factor in assessing whether changes in the ownership rules
are necessary. The FCC's review of its rules, commencing in Sep-
tember 2002 and completed in the summer of 2003, took place
in the context of a marketplace that had seen increasing consoli-
dation, rather than increased competition.
In fact, since the 1996 Act, consolidation in the media indus-
try has been overwhelming. Comcast acquired AT&T's cable
properties, AOL acquired Time Warner, Viacom acquired CBS,
GE acquired Vivendi Universal's television and film assets, and
21. Broadcast Ownership Rules, Cross-Ownership of Broadcast Stations
and Newspapers, Multiple Ownership of Radio Broadcast Stations in Local Mar-
kets, and Definition of Radio Markets, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,286 (Aug. 5, 2003) (to be
codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73).
22. Online News Hour, Merging Media: How Relaxing FCC Ownership Rules
Has Affected the Media Business, at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/ media/con-
glomeration/fcc2.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2005) (on file with the Notre Dame
Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
23. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202.
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News Corporation acquired DirecTV.2 4 Comcast also partnered
with Sony Corporation most recently in agreeing to acquire
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., one of five remaining U.S. indepen-
dent film studios.25
The result has been that the companies that produce local
and national news are huge conglomerates with distribution,
Internet, newspaper, television, and radio assets. All five owners
of broadcast networks (CBS, ABC, Fox, Time Warner (WB), and
NBC) all own film production, film libraries, television produc-
tion, and cable networks in addition to their broadcast net-
works.2 6 These media giants' control over the public audience
has been solid. Despite the promise for more diversity from new
sources such as the Internet and satellite, these media companies
control nearly the same prime time audience shares as the top
three networks did forty years ago.2 7
These five firms and a sixth close ally account for almost
three-quarters of the television audience, programming expendi-
tures and writing budgets of the entire industry, and own over
four-fifths of the prime time shows. 28 This consolidation has also
led to a decrease in independent programming. In 1992, only
fifteen percent of new series were produced by a network-con-
trolled company, in 2002 this percentage rose to seventy-seven
percent.
29
In 2003, an episode of Nightline looking into this decrease in
diversity quoted Los Angeles Times media critic Howard Rosenberg
as saying he has "already seen the future, in Los Angeles. There,
three of the networks already own at least two TV stations each.
On the Viacom stations, you can watch the same news reporter
on the same night, on two different channels-and the same
investigative reporter-and the same weather man."' 0
Massive radio consolidation has occurred as well. For exam-
ple, ten parent companies control two-thirds of listeners and
24. Joe Lauria, ComcastJoins Consolidation Bandwagon, THE BUSINESS, Feb.
29, 2004, at 9.
25. Britt Erica Tunik, Stubborn Sony Wins MGM, Finally: A $150 Million
Nonrefundable Deposit Seals a Three-Year Saga, INVESTMENT DEALERS DIGEST, Jan.
17, 2005, at 52.
26. Media Ownership: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Mark Cooper, President,
Consumer Federation of America).
27. Media Ownership: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science,




30. Nightline (ABC television broadcast, June 2, 2003).
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radio revenues across the nation, with the largest company own-
ing 1,200 stations nationwide. Prior to 1996, the largest nation-
wide radio station only owned sixty-five stations each. This
consolidation has also resulted in a decrease in local content and
diversity of ownership in radio."1
The impact of massive media consolidation has had real
world consequences, including in my own state of North Dakota.
In January 2002, in Minot, North Dakota, a train carrying anhy-
drous ammonia derailed at 1:39 a.m. and spewed a cloud of
anhydrous ammonia over the entire town. Unfortunately, the
Emergency Alert System (EAS) that authorities would generally
use to put emergency information on the air at the local radio
station was not engaged properly, and the police could not reach
anyone at the lead radio station by phone. Instead, the radio
station continued to play music and the emergency bulletins
were delayed while the station staff was located. 2
The failure of the EAS system was a critical factor in the fail-
ure to immediately notify the town over the radio, but media
consolidation was a contributing factor as well. Of the seven
commercial radio stations in Minot, six were owned by one
media entity, which had all of its stations on auto-pilot (the sev-
enth was a religious station)." While Clear Channel contends
that it had staff working that night at the lead radio station, 4
common ownership of the overwhelming majority of the com-
mercial radio stations undoubtedly had an impact on the public
safety agency's ability to publicize information.
The recent focus on the rise in indecency in broadcasting is
also linked to rising media consolidation. The largest owners of
television and radio broadcast holdings have received the great-
est number of indecency complaints and the largest fines, and
over eighty percent of the fines proposed by the FCC for inde-
cent broadcasts were against stations owned by two of the top
three radio companies.3" The top radio company alone accounts
for over two-thirds of the fines proposed by the FCC since 2000
31. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 432 (3d. Cir. 2004).
32. SeeJennifer B. Lee, On Minot, N.D., Radio, A Single Corporate Voice, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 31, 2003, at Cl.
33. Id.
34. See Clear Channel Communications, Know the Facts, http://www.
clearchannel.com/Corporate/corporate-ktf.aspx (last visited Apr. 2, 2005) (on
file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
35. The Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2004: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Telecommunications and the Internet of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 108th Cong. 108 (2004) (statement of Michael J. Copps, Comm'r,
FCC).
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and two of the largest fines proposed by the FCC were against the
largest radio companies.3 6
In 2004, the FCC received over 500,000 indecency com-
plaints in response to the Superbowl Halftime show aired on CBS
and produced by MTV, both of which are owned by Viacom. 7
This is the largest number of complaints ever received by the
FCC for a single broadcast. In addition, the number of inde-
cency complaints increased from 111 in 2000 to 240,350 in
2003.38 In 2004, including the complaints for the Superbowl, the
FCC received an astounding number of 1,405,419 complaints.3 9
Media consolidation and the resulting disassociation from
localism have also contributed to the rising indecency in broad-
casting. Media conglomerates do not consider or reflect local
community standards. The FCC has no record of a television sta-
tion owned by one of the big four networks pre-empting national
programming for failing to meet community standards. How-
ever, non-network-owned stations have often rejected national
network programming found to be indecent and offensive to
local community standards.4" In addition, a letter from a station
manager of a locally-owned and operated station to a viewer
stated that programming decisions are made by network head-
quarters and not by the locally-owned and operated television sta-
tion management.4 The Parents Television Council found that
the "losers" of network ownership "are the local communities
whose standards of decency are being ignored."4 2
36. See Frank Ahrens, Radio Giant in Record Indecency Settlement, WASH.
POST, June 9, 2004, at Al; FCC Settlement Clears Clear Channel of All Indecency Fines,
COMM. DAILY, June 10, 2004 [hereinafter FCC Settlement].
37. S. REP. No. 108-253, at 5 (2004); Chris Baker, TV Complaints to FCC
Soar as Parents Lead the Way, WASH. TIMES, May 24, 2004, at Al.
38. Letter from Michael K. Powell, Chairman of FCC, to John D. Dingell,
Ranking Member on House Committee on Energy and Commerce 8 (Mar. 2,
2004) (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
39. See FCC, Indecency Complaints and NALs: 1993-2004 (Mar. 4, 2005), at
http://www.fcc.gov/eb/broadcast/ichart.pdf (on file with the Notre Dame
Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
40. See Media Ownership: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci-
ence and Transportation, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of'Jim Goodmon, Presi-
dent and CEO, Capitol Broadcasting Co.), available at http://commerce.senate.
gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=758&wit id=2050 (on file with the Notre Dame
Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
41. Letter from Cheryl MacDonald, Vice President/General Manager
WDAF-TV/FOX 4, to Tim Maupin, Chapter Director, Kansas City Metro Chap-
ter Parents Television Council (July 25, 2003), available at http://www.
parentstv.org/ptc/fcc/2003/lettertopowell.pdf (on file with the Notre Dame
Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
42. Public Interest and Localism: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
Science and Transportation, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of L. Brent Bozell, III,
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Lastly, even recent elections have shown the impact of
media consolidation and its negative impact on the public inter-
est. A study of election news for the seven weeks up to the 2002
elections found that large station owners carried a lower percent-
age of local campaign news than the national average, while the
small and mid-sized owners carried a higher percentage of local
stories.4"
In 2004, the top three networks showed a mere three hours
each of the Democratic Convention and the Republican Conven-
tion. While PBS and cable channels carried more coverage, the
networks showed only an hour a night from 10 p.m. until 11
p.m., and actually skipped a night of coverage for each conven-
tion, choosing not to show any coverage of Tuesday night's Dem-
ocratic Convention or Monday night's Republican Convention.
4 4
The Online News Hour reported on the decreasing conven-
tion coverage in July of 2000. It reported the sad decline over
the years. In 1976, the three major networks provided more than
fifty hours of convention coverage. By 1996, that coverage had
dropped to twelve hours, and by my calculations, this year we
stand at a grand total of six.45
It is clear that over the years, with rising media consolidation
and government relaxation of licensing and ownership rules, the
public interest responsibilities of broadcasters have fallen to the
wayside.
IV. THE FCC RULES REVIEW AND JUNE 2, 2003 ORDER
In this context of rising consolidation and increased inde-
cency on the airwaves, the FCC conducted its review of the own-
ership rules. It is disturbing that although this review found that
over two million comments were filed opposing relaxation of the
ownership rules, the FCC held only one limited public hearing.
There was strong objection at the Commissioner level for the fail-
President, Media Research Center, Parents Television Council, and the Con-
servative Communications Center), available at http://commerce. senate.gov/
hearings/testimony.cfm?id= 8
7 4 &wit id=2427 (on file with the Notre Dame
Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
43. See LEAR CTR. LOCAL NEWS ARCHIVE, LOCAL TV NEWS COVERACE OF
THE 2002 GENERAL ELECTION 19-20 (2003), available at http://www.local new-
sarchive.org/pdf/LocaTV200
2
.pdf (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of
Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
44. David Bauder, Fox News Channel's Triumph Marks Interesting Week of Con-
vention Coverage, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 5, 2004.
45. Online News Hour, Unconventional Coverage (July 31, 2000) available at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/media/July-decOO/convention- 7-31.html
(on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
2005]
452 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 19
ure to consult with the public, given the overwhelming impact
that revision of the rules could have on the public interest.46
Congress was also concerned with the FCC majority's pro-
cess as well. Senator Snowe and I sent a letter with thirteen otherSenate colleagues in April 2003 to then Chairman Powell, noting
our disappointment with the FCC's announcement that it wouldbe releasing its rules in final form on June 2, 2003, without any
opportunity for Congress or the public to review them before-hand. The letter expressed concern that it would be "virtuallyimpossible to serve the public interest in this extremely impor-
tant and highly complex proceeding without letting the publicknow about and comment on the changes" that the FCC
intended to make.
In its June 2nd Order, the FCC issued its new broadcast own-
ership rules. These rules relaxed the local television multiple
ownership limit so that in the largest markets a company could
own three television stations. The FCC raised the national televi-
sion ownership cap to forty-five percent and eliminated the priorban on newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership and combined theprevious newspaper/broadcast and radio/television cross-owner-
ship rules into looser cross-media limits. The rules also rede-fined how local radio markets would be calculated. The FCCdeveloped a "Diversity Index," to determine how many media
entities to allow in a market.4 7
The result of these new rules is outrageous as in the largest
markets one company could own a newspaper, three television
stations, and eight radio stations. In addition, under the Diver-
sity Index created by the FCC, public stations count the same no
matter where they are. Incredibly, Minot, North Dakota, wouldbe treated as though it were the same size as Baltimore, San
Diego, and New Orleans.4"
This was, simply put, a cave-in to corporate interests by an
agency charged with protecting the public interest. Instead of
taking steps to enhance diversity, competition, and localism, the
new rules promote concentration and consolidation. Aside fromdeparting from its public interest obligations, the FCC's new
relaxed rules were even more inexplicable given the climate in
which they occurred: rampant consolidation and a decline in
quality and diverse programming.
46. See FCC Settlement, supra note 36; Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC,373 F.3d 372, 386 (3d. Cir. 2004).
47. See 47 C.F.R. pt. 73.
48. See Prometheus Radio, 373 F.3d at 408.
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The FCC's actions resulted in an immediate and significant
outcry. Public interest and consumer advocacy groups filed into
court to stem the deregulation, while media interests contested
the rules on the basis that they believed the rules did not go far
enough. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals stayed the rules on
September 3, 2003, pending review of the case.
During the pendency of the case, Congress took significant
steps to disapprove the action of the FCC, further illustrating that
the FCC's action had totally contravened statutory intent. Both
the House and the Senate passed legislation to lower the national
television cap back to thirty-five percent from the FCC's increase
to forty-five percent. In addition, by a vote of 55-40 the Senate
passed S.J. Res. 17, my resolution of disapproval to negate the
FCC's action. Unfortunately, due to opposition by House leader-
ship, the resolution of disapproval was not taken up in the
House, despite widespread support, and subsequent amend-
ments to other legislation to strike the FCC's rules have also met
resistance by the House Republican majority.
On June 24, 2004, however, the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit acted decisively in remanding a majority of the new
FCC rules, resulting in a victory for the public interest and a
defeat for media consolidation. The court specifically noted that
it did not interpret Section 202(h) of the 1996 Telecommunica-
tions Act to mean that the public interest analysis required a loos-
ening of the ownership rules. In fact, the court noted that the
Commission had equal authority to implement more stringent
regulations.4 9
While the court affirmed some of the Commission's Order,
it found that for the most part the rules did not meet with the
FCC's public interest obligations, and for that reason remanded
the rules back to the FCC. The court concluded:
[W]e have identified several provisions in which the Com-
mission falls short of its obligation to justify its decisions to
retain, repeal, or modify its media ownership regulations
with reasoned analysis. The Commission's derivation of
new Cross-Media Limits, and its modification of the
numerical limits on both television and radio station own-
ership in local markets, all have the same essential flaw: an
unjustified assumption that media outlets of the same type




50. Id. at 435.
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The court rejected the FCC's Diversity Index that wholly dis-
regarded community and localism in favor of generalized market
weights, saying that "[a] Diversity Index that requires us to accept
that a community college television station makes a greater con-
tribution to viewpoint diversity than a conglomerate that
includes the third-largest newspaper in America also requires us
to abandon both logic and reality." 1
The court also noted the lack of public notice prior to thedevelopment of the new rules and advised that the FCC make its
rules on remand open to public notice and comment.52
CONCLUSION
The Third Circuit's ruling and continued stay of the FCC's
new rules should be a wake-up call to the majority at the FCC.
The agency now has a chance to go back to its roots and its fun-
damental purpose as set forth by Congress: to act in the public
interest. The public is not served by ever growing media behe-
moths that drown out local or varied voices and impose uniform
standards on diverse communities. The fundamental principles
of the First Amendment and of fostering discourse can only be
achieved when limits on media ownership are imposed with thepublic interest, and not corporate favors, as a guide. The Ameri-
can public deserves better from the FCC. I hope that this time
the FCC will take its responsibility to heart as the agency reviews
its action pursuant to the court's remand.
51. Id at 408.
52. Id. at 411-12.
